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  Abstract 
 
In this paper, we present an analytical model for examining the growth impact of 
intergovernmental and intersectoral allocation of  public expenditure. The model helps us 
quantify the role of fiscal decentralization in regional economic growth and identify whether 
central and local allocation of public spending among various sectors are growth-enhancing. 
Applying our analytical framework to a panel data set of 16 major states in India, we have 
found that, in many cases of our regressions, fiscal decentralization is positively, and even 
statistically significantly, associated with state economic growth. The state allocation of 
public spending in various sectors is broadly consistent with “growth-maximizing”, whereas 
increases in the central allocation of its budget among development projects, 
nondevelopment projects, and social and community services  by cutting the center’s 
spending on all other functions can promote regional growth. Furthermore, the distortionary 
effect of the state tax in India is dominated by the productive effect of tax-financed public 
spending, whereas the reverse holds for the central tax. 
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  Using a panel data for 16 major Indian states from 1970 to 1994, we quantitatively 
evaluate the effect of public expenditures on local economic growth in India from a few 
perspectives. First, we seek to understand whether intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in 
expenditure and tax assignment have any bearing on state economic growth. Specifically, we 
look at the growth effect of decentralization in revenue collection and expenditure. This 
exercise can be viewed as an empirical test of the efficiency proposition of fiscal 
decentralization in a large, federal country. In this exercise, we also explicitly control the 
effect of both central and state taxes on regional economic growth. 
  Second, we broaden the existing framework of macro public expenditure analysis
1 
and examine the association between economic growth and the composition of public 
spending by both the central and state governments. In India, both the central and state 
governments have been facing hardening budget constraints. Budget-cutting involves not 
only the cut in the aggregate government spending, it also demands a clear picture on the 
budget sizes of central and local governments. Shall we cut the central government budget 
more than the local budget? Which component of public expenditures should be cut for both 
                                                   
1Currently there have been three approaches to studying the growth impact of public expenditures on economic 
growth:(1)Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990), among many others, have studied the impact of aggregate government 
spending on growth and productivity. In those studies, government spending is divided either into aggregate 
consumption and aggregate investment or into aggregate spending in different sectors. The growth impact of various 
spending by different levels of government has not been carefully examined. (2)Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) 
have taken the first step toward a systematic examination of the relationship between the composition of public 
expenditure and economic growth. While they have focused on the growth effects of various central government's 
expenditures, they have largely ignored the corresponding roles of state and local government spending in 
the growth process. (3)Finally, Davoodi, Xie and Zou (1995), Zhang and Zou (1996), and Davoodi and Zou (1996) have 
explored the growth effect of aggregate public spending by different levels of government along the line 
of fiscal-federalism arguments, but they have not looked into the composition of various public spending by different 
levels of government.    This paper unifies and extends the three above-mentioned approaches by dealing with the 
growth impact of the allocation of public expenditures among multiple sectors with multiple levels of government. 
 
   3 
the center and localities? These hard choices and realities depend on the relative 
contributions of public spending by different levels of government to economic growth. 
  Third, fiscal decentralization, the devolution of fiscal power from national 
government to subnational governments, is increasingly viewed as part of a package to 
reform the inefficient public sector, increase competition among subnational governments in 
efficient delivery of public services, and escape from low economic growth (Bahl and Linn, 
1992; Bird and Wallich, 1993, Oates, 1993). In the decentralization process, the knowledge 
of the productivity of aggregate public spending or the productivity of central government 
expenditures is not sufficient, because we need to know the relative productivity and relative 
efficiency of different public expenditures by different levels of government in order to 
achieve optimal expenditure assignments for each level of government. 
  In section 2, we provide a general, theoretical framework to integrate the allocation 
of public expenditures among various public sectors and among different levels of 
government. In section 3, as an example of practical implementation of the general 
analytical framework, we first present a picture of public expenditures by sector and level of 
government in India from 1970 to 1994. In section 4, we use the data on sixteen Indian 
states to investigate the effects on state economic growth of various public expenditures by 
both the central government and state governments. We conclude this paper in section 5. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
  We develop a theoretical model that links multiple sectors of public spending by 
multiple levels of government to economic growth in this section. To be as general as 
possible, the model assumes that there are three levels of government: federal, state, and   4 
local. In the model fiscal decentralization is defined as spending by each level of government 
as a fraction of total government spending. For example, fiscal decentralization increases if 
spending by state and local governments rises relative to spending by the federal 
government. Furthermore, for each level of government, there are various public 
expenditures. The model then allows us to analyze the efficiency gains of fiscal 
decentralization and to evaluate the growth impact of various public spending by the three 
levels of government.   
  Following Barro (1990), we begin with an endogenous growth model consisting 
of a production function with multiple inputs: private capital and multiple public spending 
by the three levels of government. Let k be private capital stock, g the total government 
spending, f the vector of federal government spending, s the vector of state government 
spending, and l the vector of local government spending: 
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The production function is a nested Cobb-Douglas
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where y is per capita output,1 0 > > α , 1 0 > > β ,  1 0 > > γ , 1 0 > > ω ,   
 
                                                   
2  The use of more general functional forms such as the CES would not alter our analysis qualitatively; see Devarajan, 
Swaroop and Zou (1995); and Davoodi, Xie and Zou (1995). 
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α β γ ω + + + = 1,  βi > 0  for  i I = 1,..., , i i β ≤ ∑ 1,  γ j > 0  for  j J = 1,..., , 
 




            The introduction of public spending by different levels of government creates 
a link between differential effects of various expenditures by three levels of government and 
growth. The division of consolidated or total government spending g among different levels 
of government takes the following form: 
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and  θ θ θ f s l + + = 1  and 0 <  θi< 1 for i =    f, s, and l. Thus,  θ f   is the share of federal 
government in total spending,  θs  is the share of state governments, and    θl  the share of 
local governments. It is further assumed that the federal government spends a share of   
δi i I ( ,..., ) = 1   on its i-th item  fi , state governments spend a share of    δ j j J ( ,..., ) = 1  
on their j-th item  sj , and local governments spend a share of    δh h H ( ,..., ) = 1   on their h-
th item  sh. 
  Therefore, 
fi i f g = δ θ   for  i I = 1,...,   and  δi = ∑ 1     6 
sj j sg = δ θ   for  j J = 1,...,   and  δs = ∑ 1          (7) 
lh h lg = δ θ   for  h H = 1,..., and  δh = ∑ 1 
 
 
  The consolidated government spending g is financed by a flat income tax at    rate 
τ : 
 
      g y = τ              (8) 
 
 
  The representative agent's preference is given by 
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where  c  is per capita private consumption, ρ   is the positive time discount rate, and 
u c f s l ( , , , )  is an increasing, concave and differentiable utility function. 
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For analytical simplicity, let 
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where  σ σ f s , , and  σl   are positive. While the productivity of the expenditures by the 
federal, state and local governments are measured byβ ,  γ , and ω , respectively, their 
impacts on the representative agent's utility are measured by  σ σ f s ,   andσl , respectively. 
All government expenditures enter the production function and the utility function in the 
Cobb-Douglas form. That is to say, production and consumption services from public   7 
expenditures are generated through a specific production technology. Again, the Cobb-
Douglas form is adapted here for analytical tractability. 
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  Given the total government spending g, the constant tax rate  τ , and the shares of 
spending by different levels of government ( ' , , , ) θi s i f s l =   among the aggregate 
government spending, and the shares of allocations of public expenditures among various 
sectors by each level of government ( , ,..., , , ,..., δ δ i j i I j J = = 1 1   and  δh h H , ,..., ), = 1  
representative agent's choices are determined by maximizing (9) with respect to c and k 
subject to (10) and initial conditions. Along the balanced growth, the solution for the per 
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For the case that , β γ i j = = ∑ ∑ 1 1 ,   and  ωh = ∑ 1,    the expression can be further   
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  Both equation (13) and (14) show that the long-run growth rate of per capita output 
is a function of the tax rate, shares of spending by different levels of government, and the 
shares of spending allocation on various public expenditures undertaken by the three levels 
of    government, respectively. This understanding is the theoretical foundation for our 
empirical investigation on the relationship between growth and intersectoral and 
intergovernmental allocations of public expenditures. Please note that, for a given share of 
total government spending in GDP, a reallocation of public spending among different levels 
of government and among different sectors can lead to higher economic growth if the 
existing allocation is different from the growth-maximizing allocation of public 
expenditures. To show this point, we maximize the growth rate in the simple case of 
equation (14): 
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by choosing δi( ,...,), 1 1 =     δ j j J ( ,..., ), = 1    δh h H ( ,..., ), =1 θ f ,   θs,   and  θl  
subject to the constraint θ θ θ f s l + + =1,  δi ∑ = 1,   δ j ∑ = 1  and  δh ∑ = 1.  The 
solution to this problem involves the following formulae for the growth-maximizing case: 
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  for  h H = 1,...,             (21) 
 
Therefore, as long as the actual θ θ θ δ f s l i i I , , , ( ,..., ), = 1 ( ) δ j j J = 1,...,   and  
δh h H ( ,..., ) = 1 differ from the growth-maximizing ones  θ θ θ δ f s l i i I
* * * * , , , ( ,..., ) = 1 , 
δ j j J *( ,..., ) = 1   and  δh h H *( ,..., ) = 1 as in (16) to (21), the growth rate can always be 
increased without any change in the tax rate and the total budget size in the GDP. 
  We also have simple explanations for the growth-maximizing shares for different 
levels of government spending    θ θ θ f s l
* * * , , ,  and the multisector allocation of public 
spending by the three levels of government    δi i I
*( ,..., ), = 1   δ j j J *( .,..., ) = 1   and 
δh h H *( ,..., ) = 1   as in (16) to (21).    We can regard    β γ , ,     and  ω   as the measures for 
the total productivity of federal, state, and local government spending, respectively, and   10 
( ) β γ ω + +   as the aggregate productivity of all government spending. The growth-
maximizing shares for public spending allocation among three levels of government are just 
the ratios of individual productivity over the total productivity. Similarly, we can take the 
vectors  { } βi i
I
=1,  { } γ j j
J
=1and  { } ωh h
H
=1  to be the vectors of sectoral productivity (in 
generating productive services) for the multisector expenditures by the federal, state, and 
local governments, respectively. For each level of government, these productivity measures 
sum to unity. The growth-maximizing rule for each sector allocation at each level of 
government is again the ratio of its productivity over the total productivity, which is one. Of 
course, these explanations depend on our specific assumptions on the production technology. 
For a general production technology, it is difficult to have the nice separability in the rules 
for allocating public spending among different levels of government from the rules for 
spending among multiple sectors by each level of government. 
  Regarding fiscal decentralization and the allocation of budget among different levels 
of government, an important point can be derived from this theoretical exercise: it does not 
hold true that the more decentralized a country's fiscal system becomes, the faster its 
economy grows. As far as economic growth is concerned, there exists only an optimal degree 
of fiscal decentralization, which is determined by the relative productivity of different levels 
of government spending in our specific example. 
  In our specific example, it is very easy to show that the growth-maximizing 
allocation rules for public expenditures are the same as the welfare-maximizing rules for 
public spending as a result of logarithmic utility function. This is an extension of the result 
obtained by Davoodi, Xie, and Zou ( 1995).     11 
  From our theoretical analysis in equation (14), the growth rate is determined directly 
by the tax rate, the allocation of public spending among different levels of governments, the 
allocation of spending among different sectors by each level of government, and other 
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where Z is a vector of other exogenous variables in growth literature that we will control in 
our estimations and    µ's  are the coefficients to be estimated. It shall be noted that we have 
dropped  θ δ δ δ f I J H , , ,   in equation    (22) because of the various add-up conditions for 
these share variables. 
 
3      Fiscal decentralization, public spending,    and growth in India: 
1970-94 
  The constitution of the Republic of India can be described as quasi-federal in 
character because it provides for a federal structure with a strong unitary feature. The states 
have a substantial degree of autonomy within the area of responsibility granted to them by 
the constitution. At the same time, local government affairs are entirely within the states’ 
sphere, and local governments do not have constitutional status (see Chelliah, 1990; 
Agarwala, 1992, Rao and Sen, 1996, Rao, 1997, and Singh, 1997, for details).   
  For expenditure assignments between the center and states, the constitution provides 
three lists: the Union list, the States list, and the concurrent list. All matters relating to 
defense, currency, banking, foreign affairs, and interstate relations are in the exclusive 
domain of the central government. The states are responsible for maintenance of law and   12 
order and the courts, the social sector, agriculture, infrastructure, trade within the state, and 
overall development of the state economy. The concurrent list of responsibility includes 
important civil matter such as law, marriage, succession, administration of justice, trusts and 
civil procedure, economic and social planning, social security, education, trade unions, and 
electricity. By international comparison, especially among developing countries, India is 
quite decentralized by the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization: the share of 
subnational (state) government spending out of    the total (state and central) government 
spending. Table 1 shows the ratio of total state spending over total government spending 
according to IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). From 1974 to 1993 this ratio was 
between 60 - 64% and remained stable.   
  On the revenue side, the constitutional assignment of tax powers has been based on 
two principles. The first is the avoidance of assigning any one tax to the center and the states 
at the same time. The second is that the most important taxes, which have economywide 
implications or which can be collected most efficiently and economically by the central 
government, should be assigned to the center.    In the end, the center has the power to levy 
individual and corporate income tax , all excise taxes, and custom duties. Therefore, the 
central government has the most productive sources of revenue with wide bases. According 
to IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the share of state revenue collection out of 
total government tax revenue ranged from 31-36% from 1974 to 1993. Therefore, the 
revenue measure of fiscal decentralization is relatively low compared to the corresponding 
spending measure (see Table 1). 
  The composition of central government expenditures is illustrated in Tables 2a and 
2b. Table 2a is calculated according to the IMF’s GFS classification. Defense spending 
relative to other services was the highest, about 15-26% of the total budget. Spending on   13 
health, education, and transportation were    relatively low, ranging from 1 to 3%. Spending 
was moderate on general public services (6-9%), agriculture (5-10%), housing (3-7%), 
mining (2-8%), and other economic services (5-9%). Spending on mining decreased steadily 
from 9 to 2% from 1977 to 1993,    while spending on housing rose substantially from 3 to 
7% during the same period.    At the same time, its spending share on general public services 
remained stable. 
  Table 2b provides another perspective on central spending on the basis of    India 
Economic Statistics (various years). It divides spending into three major categories: 
development spending, nondevelopment spending, and social and community services. From 
1970 to 1990, on average,    the central government spent 31% of its budget on 
development, 47.5% on non-development services, and 6.4% on social and community 
services.   
  Table 3 provides data on state spending by function according to IMF’s GFS. Across 
the states, major budget allocation went to education (22-25%),  agriculture  (14  -25%), 
and general public services (14-18%). Spending for health, housing, social security, energy, 
and transportation was moderate. ranging between 4-7% of total state spending. We also 
note that total state spending on various functions was highly stable in terms of the allocation 
ratios. 
  In order to have a better understanding of public spending at the individual state 
level, we have collected spending data for 16 major Indian states in four categories: 
administration, economic services, education, and health; see Tables 4-7. These tables show 
large variations in public spending across states and over time. For example, on the average, 
Kerala spent about 7% of its total budget on administration (Table 4), while Bihar and 
Punjab spent about 11% on administration. In the state of Assam, the spending share on   14 
administration varied from a minimum of 1.4% to a maximum of 14.5% in Assam between 
1970 and 1994. Many other states also experienced    large changes in spending for 
administration. 
  Spending for economic services was the largest single item of state spending across 
Indian states. On average, their spending share ranged from 27% in West Bengal to 46% in 
Haryana; see Table 5. Over time, the spending share for economic services was also much 
more stable than the share for administration.   
  Education spending varied across states and over time. For example, spending share 
for education varied from 2 to 22.7% in Himachal Pradesh. But on average, it accounted 
for 16 to 28% of state budget from 1970-1994; see Table 6.   
  As with administration, state spending shares on health (Table 7) varied significantly 
from highs of 6.7% in Haryana to 13% in Himachal Pradesh to lows of 0.2% in Madhya 
Pradesh, 0.4% in Maharashtra, 0.5% in Orissa, and 0.6% in Punjab.   
  Table 8 presents a brief look at the growth picture across the 16 major Indian states 
from 1970 to 1994. All states experienced large variations in their per capita income growth 
rates with episodes of significant, negative growth in per capita income. During the 24 years 
in our sample, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra performed relatively well, with an 
average growth rate greater than 3%. At the same period, Rajasthan, West Bengal, and 
Bihar performed poorly, with an average annual growth rate of around 1%. 
  With a panel data on the 16 states, we can look at fiscal decentralization from the 
state perspective rather than the national aggregate ratios, such as total state spending to total 
central spending and total state revenue collection to total central collection, which were 
discussed earlier using the IMF’s data (Table 1). Two alternative measures immediately   15 
come forward as plausible indicators: (1) the ratio of    state spending in each state to total 
central spending, and (2) the ratio of state own revenue collection in each state to total 
central revenue collection. Rises in    these two ratios across the 16 states implies fiscal 
decentralization because more spending and revenue collection are undertaken by the sixteen 
states instead of the    center. However, if these ratios increase in some states and decrease in 
other states, the aggregate picture is obscured because the ratio of total state spending (own 
revenue) to the central spending (revenue) may stay the same. In this case, we cannot say too 
much about how economic growth relates to fiscal decentralization. But from the state 
perspective, the rise and fall in these two ratios and their effects on state spending and 
economic growth can be clearly identified. 
  Since Indian states have different sizes in terms of population size, area, and GDP, 
we can make the ratios more comparable across states using two adjusted measures: (1) the 
ratio of per capita state spending in each state to per capita central spending, and (2) the ratio 
of per capita state revenue collection in each state to per capita central revenue collection. 
Table 9 illustrates the ratio of per capita state spending in each of the 16 states to per capital 
central spending from 1970 to 1994. Himachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab had 
a higher degree of fiscal decentralization than the other states in terms of per capita state 
spending relative to per capita central spending. It is clear from Table 9 that there are less 
variations in fiscal decentralization over time than the variations across the 16 states. 
 
4      Empirical estimations with state-level data 
4.1  Variables and estimation equations   16 
  Our review of public expenditures by sectors and by levels of    government in India 
shows large variation and diversity across states and over time. The same can be said of the 
growth rate across states. To examine how intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and 
allocation of public spending in different sectors by the central and state governments have 
affected regional (state) economic growth, we utilize the panel data over from 1970 to 1994 
for 16 major Indian states. The dependent variable is real per capita income growth rate in 
each state. We take a five-year forward-moving average of per capita real income growth in 
our regression analysis in order to eliminate short-term fluctuations, increase the number of 
time series observations in our panel data, and reflect the delayed impact of public 
expenditures on economic growth (for methodological details on the lagged structure of 
growth rates see Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou, 1996). The regression equation is defined as 
follows: 
Y FDC CDEV CNONDEV CSOCCOM SADM
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where the variables are: 
  Y t t
i
( , ) + + 1 5 : Five-year forward-moving average of per capita real income growth in state 
i. 
  FDCt
i : Measures of fiscal decentralization across states at time t. Four alternatives 
will be utilized in this paper:   
    (1) FDCEXP t
i   = (total state public spending in state i)/(total central spending), 
    (2) FDCEXPPC t
i = (per capita state spending in state i)/(per capital central spending), 
    (3) FDCTAX t
i = (total state own revenue in state i)/(total central revenue), 
    (4) FDCTAXPC t
i   = (per capita state revenue in state i)/(per capital central revenue).     17 
  CDEV t : Ratio of    central development spending to total central spending at time t. 
  CNONDEV t : Ratio of central nondevelopment spending to total central spending at 
time t. 
  CSOCCOM t : Ratio of central social and community service spending to total 
central spending at time t. 
  SADM t
i : Ratio of state administration spending to total state spending in state i at 
time t. 
  SEDU t
i : Ratio of state education spending to total state spending in state i at time t. 
  SHLTH t
i : Ratio of state health spending to total state spending in state i at time t. 
  SECON t
i : Ratio of state economic development spending to total state spending in 
state i at time t. 
  Z t
i : A vector of other control variables in standard growth regression analysis such 
as the area of each state (AREA), initial (year 1970) per capita real income in each state 
(GDP70), secondary school enrollment (SCHOOLING) in each state, the ratio of state own 
tax revenue to state aggregate income (SOTAX)  in each state, and the central tax rate 
(CTAX) defined as the ratio of total central tax revenue over national GDP in India. See 
Levine and Renelt (1992), and Deverajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) for the counterparts in 
cross-country regression analysis.   
  From our theoretical analysis, the growth rate is determined directly by the tax rate, 
the allocation of public spending among different levels of government, the allocation of 
spending among different sectors by each level of government, and other exogenous   18 
variables. Regression (23) can be regarded as a linear approximation of our nonlinear result 
in equation (13) or (14).   
 
4.2  Regression results 
  We divide our regression analysis into four parts depending on the choice of the four 
measures of fiscal decentralization listed in the subsection above. The results are presented in 
Tables 10-13. These four tables generate very consistent results for most variables, so we 
summarize the main results next. 
  First, except for the one measure of fiscal decentralization, FDCEXP, the other three 
measures have positive and even significant estimated coefficients. Therefore, fiscal 
decentralization, especially decentralization in tax revenue collection,    is in general 
positively associated with Indian regional economic growth on the basis our preliminary 
statistical analysis. It is interesting to note that when the explanatory variable is the ratio of 
state spending to central spending in each state,    FDCEXP, the estimated coefficients under 
different specifications of the regression equations have very insignificant, negative signs 
(Table 10). When the ratio is adjusted by population size, FDCEXPPC, the estimated 
coefficients are all positive and with much higher t-statistics ranging from 0.4 to 1.24, weak 
evidence for the positive impact    of fiscal decentralization on state economic growth in 
India (Table 12). When the measure of fiscal decentralization is the ratio of state own 
revenue collection to central revenue collection, FDCTAX, four estimated coefficients out 
the five in Table 11 are positive with t-statistics between 1.08 to 1.56. When the 
decentralization measure is the ratio of per capita state tax revenues to per capita central tax 
revenue, FDTAXPC, (Table 13), these positive estimates are statistically even more 
significant with the t-statistics between 1.3 to 2.7.   19 
  Second, all shares of central government spending on    development (CDEV) 
nondevelopment (CNONDEV), and social and community services (CSOCCOM) are 
positively and statistically significantly associated with state economic growth (Tables 10-
13). Thus, increases in the central allocation of its budget among these three functions by 
cutting the cetner’s spending on all other functions can promote regional growth. 
  Third,    all shares of state spending on administration (SADM), education (SEDU), 
health (SHLTH), and economic development (SECON) have rather mixed signs with no 
statistical significance (Tables 10-13). These results suggest that state public spending shares 
are broadly consistent with growth-maximizing allocation of public spending.   
  Fourth, the central tax (CTAX)  is negatively associated with state economic 
growth, suggesting that the central tax rate is on the wrong side of the “Laffer curve” in the 
sense of    the Barro (1990) model. At the same time,    the state tax has a positive, 
significant effect on economic growth and is on the left side of the “Laffer curve”. These 
results indicate the possibility that central tax collection is too high relative to state 
collection, and a further decentralization in revenue collection promotes regional economic 
growth.    Since both the central tax and state tax revenues finance productive public 
spending, the effect of    a moderately distortionary tax may be outweighed by the substantial 
productive effect of tax revenues. Our preliminary results support this theoretical prediction 
for the state tax, not for the central tax.     
  Fifth, for all other control variables, we find that    human capital formation 
represented by the variable (Schooling) is positively associated with state economic growth, 
whereas area (AREA) and initial income (GDP70) have no significant effect on state 
economic growth.   20 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  In this paper, we have presented an analytical model for examining the growth 
impact of intergovernmental and intersectoral allocation of    public expenditure. The model 
helps us quantify the role of fiscal decentralization in regional economic growth and identify 
whether central and local allocation of public spending among various sectors is growth-
enhancing.   
  Applying our analytical framework to a panel data set of 16 major states in India, we 
have found that, in many cases of our regressions, fiscal decentralization is positively, and 
even statistically significantly, associated with state economic growth. The state allocation of 
public spending in various sectors is broadly consistent with “growth-maximizing”, whereas 
increases in the central allocation of its budget among development projects, 
nondevelopment projects, and social and community services  by cutting the center’s 
spending on all other functions can promote regional growth. Furthermore, the distortionary 
effect of the state tax in India is dominated by the productive effect of tax-financed public 
spending, whereas the reverse holds for the central tax. 
  Our empirical findings here provide some support    for the decentralization theorem 
in the sense of Oates (1972, 1993). Recently Oates (1993) states: 
The basic economic case for fiscal decentralization is the enhancement of economic 
efficiency..... There surely are strong reasons, in principle, to believe that policies 
formulated for the provision of infrastructure and even human capital that are 
sensitive to regional or local conditions are likely to be more effective in encouraging   21 
economic development that centrally determined policies that ignore these 
geographical differences. 
The positive, and sometimes even significant effect of the three measures of fiscal 
decentralization on regional economic growth found here for India is a remarkable empirical 
result in light of many cases of a negative impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth for China (Zhang and Zou, 1996), the United States (Davoodi, Xie, and Zou, 1995), 
a full sample of developing countries (Davoodi and Zou, 1996), and a full sample of both 
developing and developed countries (Davoodi and Zou, 1996). Still further empirical work 
and especially more country case studies are badly needed in order to understand how fiscal 
decentralization affects economic efficeincy in the real world. 
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Table 1: Aggregate Picture of Fiscal Decentralization (1974--1993)                   
                                         
  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
State Rev. / 
St&C Rev. 
32%  33%  33%  32%  33%  33%  33%  34%  34%  33%  33%  32%  32%  32%  32%  31%  33%  33%  32%  36% 
State Exp. / 
St.&C Exp. 
63%  62%  62%  64%  64%  63%  64%  64%  64%  64%  63%  63%  62%  62%  62%  63%  62%  63%  64%  60% 
                                         
Data Source: IMF's GFS                                   
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Table 2-a: Central Expenditure by Function as Share of Total Central Expenditure(1974-1993)       
                                         
  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
Gen. Pub. Serv.  8%  9%  8%  7%  7%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  7%  6%  6%  6%  6%  7%  7%  7% 
Defense  26%  25%  23%  22%  20%  20%  20%  21%  21%  20%  19%  18%  20%  20%  19%  17%  17%  15%  15%  16% 
Education  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  3%  3%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2% 
Health  1%  2%  3%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  1%  2%  2%  2%  2% 
Housing  3%  3%  3%  3%  4%  4%  4%  4%  4%  5%  5%  5%  6%  6%  6%  7%  6%  6%  6%  7% 
Agric.  7%  5%  4%  6%  7%  9%  7%  6%  6%  8%  10%  8%  8%  7%  8%  7%  8%  8%  8%  6% 
Mining  6%  7%  8%  9%  7%  7%  6%  7%  7%  6%  7%  6%  6%  5%  5%  6%  6%  4%  3%  2% 
Transportation        2%  3%  3%  3%  3%  3%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  3%  2%  2%  2%  2% 
Oth. Econ.  5%  5%  6%  7%  9%  7%  8%  8%  8%  7%  7%      6%  6%  6%  5%  7%  6%  9% 
Oth Exp.  39%  38%  40%  39%  39%  41%  42%  42%  41%  41%  40%  43%  41%  42%  43%  44%  45%  48%  50%  49% 
                                         
Data Source: IMF's GFS                                   
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Table 2-b:    Central Expenditure by Sector as Share of Total Central Exp.:    (1970-1994)   
         
  Sector      Minimum      Maximum      Average      STDEV   
  Development    25.24%  35.66%  31.15%                  
0.0261   
  Non-Development    42.10%  57.93%  47.50%                  
0.0445   
  Social & Community Services    5.30%  7.37%  6.40%                  
0.0048   
         
Data Source: See Data Appendix       
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Table 3: State Expenditure by Function as Share of Total State Expenditure(1974-1993)         
                                         
  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
Gen. Pub. Serv.  18%  17%  17%  16%  15%  16%  16%  16%  16%  15%  16%  14%  15%  15%  15%  16%  16%  16%  17%  17% 
Education  25%  25%  24%  25%  24%  23%  22%  23%  23%  23%  23%  24%  23%  23%  23%  25%  25%  23%  23%  23% 
Health  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  6%  5%  5%  5% 
Social Security  4%  4%  4%  4%  3%  3%  4%  4%  5%  6%  6%  5%  6%  6%  5%  6%  6%  6%  5%  5% 
Housing  4%  4%  5%  4%  5%  4%  5%  6%  5%  6%  8%  9%  8%  8%  8%  6%  7%  7%  7%  7% 
Rec. Cult. Rel.  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1% 
Agri  20%  21%  22%  24%  25%  24%  23%  22%  22%  20%  21%  19%  19%  18%  18%  16%  15%  15%  15%  14% 
Mining  1%  1%  1%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2% 
Fuel & Energy  3%  4%  3%  4%  4%  4%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  6%  5%  5%  4%  9%  6%  6% 
Transport.  7%  7%  7%  7%  8%  8%  7%  7%  6%  6%  6%  6%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  6%  6% 
Other Econ.  2%  2%  1%  1%  2%  3%  3%  3%  2%  2%  1%  2%  1%  1%  2%  2%  2%  1%  2%  2% 
Other Exp.  7%  8%  7%  7%  6%  6%  6%  6%  7%  7%  7%  8%  9%  9%  9%  10%  11%  11%  12%  12% 
                                         
Data Source: IMF's GFS                                     28 
 
Table 4: State Spending on Administration (as share of total state spending): 1970-1994 
         
  State      Minimum      Maximum      Average      STDEV   
Andhra Pradesh  7.53%  10.27%  8.69%  0.0088 
Assam  1.41%  14.55%  10.65%  0.0352 
Bihar  9.44%  15.37%  10.95%  0.0141 
Gujarat  6.25%  24.62%  9.15%  0.0396 
Haryana  6.50%  10.81%  8.08%  0.0090 
Himachal Pradesh  8.09%  16.03%  9.82%  0.0189 
Karnataka  6.02%  8.30%  6.88%  0.0053 
Kerala  5.67%  9.32%  7.16%  0.0088 
Madhya Pradesh  7.61%  13.65%  9.00%  0.0170 
Maharashtra  8.08%  13.16%  10.03%  0.0139 
Orissa  1.89%  12.76%  7.96%  0.0246 
Punjab  8.69%  14.19%  10.97%  0.0165 
Rajasthan  6.10%  11.15%  8.00%  0.0134 
Tamil Nadu  6.21%  33.24%  10.55%  0.0563 
Uttar Pradesh  3.34%  12.10%  9.33%  0.0187 
West Bengal  1.58%  15.35%  10.00%  0.0255 
         
Data Source: See Data Appendix       
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Table 5: State Spending on Economic Services(as share of total state spending): 1970-1994 
         
State  Minimum  Maximum  Average  STDEV 
Andhra Pradesh  30.01%  50.87%  40.29%  0.04833 
Assam  24.22%  66.40%  35.60%  0.09261 
Bihar  26.68%  42.35%  37.91%  0.03945 
Gujarat  22.11%  51.28%  40.90%  0.22433 
Haryana  35.97%  59.56%  46.30%  0.06973 
Himachal Pradesh  31.19%  45.14%  39.93%  0.03845 
Karnataka  32.13%  48.81%  42.04%  0.04381 
Kerala  23.22%  40.27%  29.75%  0.04141 
Madhya Pradesh  24.20%  50.24%  39.62%  0.07117 
Maharashtra  20.97%  54.67%  40.06%  0.07671 
Orissa  28.49%  48.40%  38.67%  0.05807 
Punjab  24.32%  55.45%  35.88%  0.06975 
Rajasthan  18.58%  48.78%  35.78%  0.07203 
Tamil Nadu  25.73%  48.33%  34.45%  0.20565 
Uttar Pradesh  25.86%  48.05%  38.81%  0.12547 
West Bengal  19.73%  33.19%  26.85%  0.03266 
         
Data Source: See Data Appendix       
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Table 6: State Spending on Education(as share of total state spending): 1970-1994 
         
State  Minimum  Maximum  Average  STDEV 
Andhra Pradesh  9.88%  22.92%  17.80%  0.02498 
Assam  11.28%  32.26%  22.57%  0.03994 
Bihar  16.02%  26.59%  21.04%  0.02721 
Gujarat  15.55%  56.33%  21.02%  0.08508 
Haryana  13.64%  21.64%  15.93%  0.04160 
Himachal Pradesh  2.24%  22.67%  18.19%  0.04142 
Karnataka  17.62%  21.93%  19.19%  0.01336 
Kerala  8.72%  34.40%  28.05%  0.06014 
Madhya Pradesh  13.76%  25.02%  17.66%  0.03383 
Maharashtra  11.17%  22.37%  18.28%  0.02687 
Orissa  13.64%  21.94%  17.52%  0.02159 
Punjab  13.79%  25.99%  20.81%  0.03072 
Rajasthan  15.95%  23.05%  19.18%  0.02184 
Tamil Nadu  17.20%  92.82%  25.01%  0.16107 
Uttar Pradesh  0.65%  26.21%  19.09%  0.05125 
West Bengal  19.63%  26.38%  23.00%  0.01747 
         
Data Source: See Data Appendix       
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Table 7: State Spending on Health(as share of total state spending): 1970-1994 
         
State  Minimum  Maximum  Average  STDEV 
Andhra Pradesh  5.29%  9.73%  7.58%  0.01401 
Assam  0.86%  10.95%  7.09%  0.02022 
Bihar  2.00%  9.20%  7.12%  0.01802 
Gujarat  1.04%  19.97%  7.78%  0.03709 
Haryana  0.65%  11.43%  6.73%  0.02688 
Himachal Pradesh  6.49%  68.20%  12.77%  0.13118 
Karnataka  0.15%  9.70%  7.18%  0.01983 
Kerala  1.65%  13.26%  8.90%  0.03256 
Madhya Pradesh  0.19%  12.84%  7.72%  0.03100 
Maharashtra  0.38%  10.80%  7.36%  0.02472 
Orissa  0.51%  11.00%  6.96%  0.02356 
Punjab  0.57%  10.66%  7.61%  0.02236 
Rajasthan  5.27%  17.05%  9.70%  0.03751 
Tamil Nadu  5.16%  27.96%  10.32%  0.04826 
Uttar Pradesh  5.31%  10.97%  7.74%  0.01226 
West Bengal  7.28%  14.32%  10.25%  0.02064 
         
Data Source: See Data Appendix       
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Table 8: Per Capita Real Income Growth Rate by State(1970-1994)       







1994-95 Average       
from      
71-94 
STDEV 
Andhra Pradesh  4.3%  -10.7%  3.8%  -6.0%  7.6%  -2.6%  2.5%  0.081 
Assam  -0.7%  -1.7%  10.3%  1.1%  2.8%  -8.8%  2.0%  0.081 
Bihar  0.1%  -9.4%  7.4%  6.4%  5.6%  -5.7%  1.1%  0.064 
Gujarat  -3.0%  -36.0%  -5.4%  -4.6%  1.8%  25.4%  3.0%  0.145 
Haryana  6.4%  -21.8%  9.7%  -1.8%  11.4%  7.2%  2.9%  0.095 
Himachal Pradesh  2.6%  -16.9%  10.2%  -8.7%  3.2%  9.2%  2.3%  0.070 
Karnataka  -2.3%  -18.3%  -3.3%  2.8%  2.7%  4.8%  2.6%  0.079 
Kerala  -3.4%  -16.4%  -2.4%  3.4%  4.0%  1.7%  2.1%  0.063 
Madhya Pradesh  7.2%  -14.0%  22.8%  -11.3%  13.6%  -3.7%  2.6%  0.102 
Maharashtra  0.1%  -3.5%  0.1%  -1.0%  6.1%  9.2%  3.8%  0.064 
Orissa  -4.1%  -26.3%  25.2%  -13.2%  -13.4%  -1.1%  2.3%  0.129 
Punjab  1.7%  -20.6%  -11.1%  2.5%  0.4%  5.0%  2.6%  0.077 
Rajasthan  -12.9%  -25.6%  7.0%  -8.4%  20.3%  -10.2%  0.9%  0.129 
Tamil Nadu  8.4%  -24.4%  -8.0%  8.8%  7.2%  11.4%  3.4%  0.092 
Uttar Pradesh  -0.8%  -16.2%  20.4%  -0.9%  7.2%  2.2%  1.8%  0.089 
West Bengal  5.2%  -12.9%  3.5%  6.9%  4.1%  3.4%  1.1%  0.059 
                 
Data Source: See Data Appendix             
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Table 9: Fiscal Decentralization in terms of per capita total expenditure: State vs. Center 
               
 1980-81*  1984-85* 1987-88  1990-91  1993-94  Average       
from      
71-93 
STDEV 
Andhra Pradesh  11.28%  11.49%  12.27%  10.91%  13.21%  11.83%  0.008 
Assam  7.17%  8.51%  8.41%  18.64%  6.46%  8.40%  0.030 
Bihar  5.36%  4.69%  4.76%  4.81%  4.92%  5.02%  0.005 
Gujarat  10.14%  9.43%  10.44%  9.24%  10.46%  9.69%  0.022 
Haryana  12.13%  10.35%  10.09%  9.79%  9.93%  10.71%  0.012 
Himachal Pradesh  17.50%  15.55%  17.54%  14.61%  17.14%  16.69%  0.014 
Karnataka  8.30%  8.33%  7.66%  7.96%  9.18%  8.20%  0.007 
Kerala  10.46%  8.08%  7.42%  7.84%  8.53%  8.67%  0.014 
Madhya Pradesh  9.29%  9.09%  8.61%  8.73%  9.37%  7.48%  0.003 
Maharashtra  11.01%  11.04%  9.65%  9.61%  10.47%  9.91%  0.017 
Orissa  7.66%  7.42%  7.17%  6.98%  8.16%  7.48%  0.005 
Punjab  11.09%  11.26%  9.88%  10.72%  12.71%  10.78%  0.027 
Rajasthan  8.58%  6.89%  8.42%  7.08%  8.42%  7.80%  0.009 
Tamil Nadu  7.73%  7.91%  7.50%  2.08%  9.48%  8.00%  0.023 
Uttar Pradesh  6.12%  5.01%  5.45%  5.85%  5.47%  5.23%  0.014 
West Bengal  6.88%  6.64%  6.04%  6.51%  6.11%  6.39%  0.006 
               
Data Source: See Data Appendix           
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Table 10: Effect of Intersectoral and Intergovernmental Allocation of Public Expenditure   
           
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Net State Product Growth Rate         
           
Independent Variables       [1]       [2]        [3]          [4]       [5] 
CONSTANT  -0.719  -0.72  -0.731  -0.734  -1.192 
           [-
3.662] 
        [-
3.648] 
         [-
3.699] 
         [-
3.724] 
        [-
5.869] 
FDCEXP  -0.042  -0.083  -0.199  -0.15  -0.519 
           [-
0.055] 
        [-
0.082] 
         [-
0.195] 
         [-
0.147] 
        [-
0.535] 
CDEV  1.162  1.164  1.177  1.163  2.245 
            
[3.087] 
         
[3.071] 
          
[3.104] 
          
[3.075] 
         
[5.626] 
CNONDEV  0.476  0.477  0.478  0.458  0.813 
            
[3.041] 
         
[3.033] 
          
[3.041] 
          
[2.911] 
         
[5.032] 
CSOCCOM  2.583  2.579  2.563  2.586  9.513 
            
[3.514] 
         
[3.489] 
          
[3.466] 
          
[3.508] 
           
[7.55] 
SADM  0.052  0.053  0.043  0.018  0.051 
            
[0.450] 
         
[0.453] 
          
[0.369] 
           
[0.15] 
         
[0.414] 
SEDU  -0.068  -0.067  -0.058  -0.051  -0.093 
           [-
1.393] 
        [-
1.285] 
         [-
1.075] 
        [-
0.945] 
        [-
1.763] 
SHLTH  0.028  0.028  0.027  -0.006  -0.073 
            
[0.408] 
         
[0.401] 
          
[0.385] 
          [-
0.09] 
        [-
1.094] 
SECON  -0.008  -0.008  -0.012  -0.015  -0.004 
           [-
0.321] 
        [-
0.326] 
         [-
0.476] 
        [-
0.576] 
        [-
0.164] 
AREA    0  0  0  0 
          [0.061]         
[0.435] 
      [0.593]        
[0.147] 
GDP70      0  0  0 
             
[1.012] 
        [0.95]         [-
0.54] 
SCHOOLING        0.108  0.0133 
              [1.643]          
[2.19] 
CTAX          -6.392 
               [-6.685] 
SOTAX          0.253 
                
[2.622] 
Number of Observations  272  272  272  272  272 
R-Square  0.11  0.112  0.115  0.124  0.259 
Adjusted R-Square  0.084  0.081  0.081  0.087  0.222 
S.E. of Regression  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.025 
Durbin-Wats  1.403  1.405  1.39  1.375  1.53 
           
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses           35 
Data Source: See Data Appendix         
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Table 11 Effect of Intersectoral and Intergovernmental Allocation of Public Expenditure   
           
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Net State Product Growth Rate       
           
Independent Variables       [1]       [2]        [3]          [4]       [5] 
CONSTANT  -0.709  -0.691  -0.699  -0.707  -1.193 
         [-3.621]       [-3.507]        [-3.524]        [-3.567]       [-5.872] 
FDCTAX  0.087  0.111  0.099  0.085  0.018 
         [1.382]        [1.561]        [1.263]          [1.083]        [-0.22] 
CDEV  1.132  1.101  1.11  1.108  2.237 
         [3.015]          [2.91]        [2.927]         [2.925]        
[5.601] 
CNONDEV  0.467  0.458  0.46  0.444  0.815 
         [2.988]        [2.917]        [2.925]         [2.821]        
[5.048] 
CSOCCOM  2.594  2.613  2.607  2.621  9.561 
         [3.548]        [3.568]        [3.553]         [3.581]        
[7.605] 
SADM  0.045  0.04  0.036  0.014  0.03 
         [0.395]        [0.346]        [0.312]         [0.119]        
[0.242] 
SEDU  -0.071  -0.085  -0.079  -0.069  -0.097 
           [-
1.45] 
     [-1.616]        [-1.451]        [-1.269]       [-1.831] 
SHLTH  0.043  0.043  0.042  0.009  -0.065 
         [0.632]          [0.64]        [0.614]        [-0.125]       [-0.979] 
SECON  -0.012  -0.01  -0.011  -0.014  -0.002 
         [-0.471]       [-0.407]        [-0.455]        [-0.554]       [-0.067] 
AREA    0  0  0  0 
         [-0.727]           [-
0.4] 
      [-0.107]        
[0.321] 
GDP70      0  0  0 
            [0.406]         [0.428]       [-0.558] 
SCHOOLING        0.099  0.132 
               [1.516]         
[2166] 
CTAX          -6.379 
                [-6.66] 
SOTAX          0.229 
                
[2.166] 
Number of Observations  272  272  272  272  272 
R-Square  0.118  0.12  0.12  0.128  0.258 
Adjusted R-Square  0.091  0.089  0.086  0.091  0.221 
S.E. of Regression  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.025 
Durbin-Wats  1.396  1.386  1.385  1.361  1.527 
           
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses         
Data Source: See Data Appendix           37 
 
Table 12: Effect of Intersectoral and Intergovernmental Allocation of Public Expenditure   
           
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Net State Product Growth Rate       
           
Independent Variables       [1]       [2]        [3]          [4]       [5] 
CONSTANT  -0.724  -0.741  -0.742  -0.739  -1.206 
        [-3.697]       [-3.753]        [-
3.754] 
     [-3.742]       [-5.916] 
FDCEXPPC  0.068  0.101  0.081  0.038  0.053 
         [1.012]        [1.239]         
[0.882] 
      [0.404]        
[0.594] 
CDEV  1.169  1.197  1.195  1.171  2.265 
           
[3.11] 
      [3.166]         
[3.157] 
      [3.096]        
[5.649] 
CNONDEV  0.462  0.463  0.466  0.453  0.812 
          [2.949]        [2.948]          
[2.96] 
      [2.881]        
[5.033] 
CSOCCOM  2.673  2.699  2.672  2.641  9.647 
         [3.624]        [3.652]         
[3.601] 
        
[3.56] 
     [7.627] 
SADM  0.048  0.049  0.044  0.019  0.039 
         [0.414]       [0.432]        
[0.378] 
     [0.163]        
[0.323] 
SEDU  -0.058  -0.038  -0.04  -0.043  -0.082 
        [-1.146]       [-0.675]        [-
0.694] 
     [-0.758]       [-1.448] 
SHLTH  -0.003  -0.014  -0.005  -0.018  -0.087 
        [-0.034]       [-0.186]          [-
0.067] 
     [-0.234]       [-1.181] 
SECON  -0.013  -0.018  -0.017  -0.017  -0.005 
         [0.497]         [-0.67]         [-
0.671] 
     [-0.646]       [-0.224] 
AREA    0  0  0  0 
          [0.717]         
[0.764] 
        
[0.76] 
      
[0.047] 
GDP70      0  0  0 
             
[0.489] 
     [0.648]       [-0.719] 
SCHOOLING        0.099  0.122 
              [1.448]        
[1.929] 
CTAX          -6.41 
               [-6.703] 
SOTAX          0.236 
                
[2.527] 
Number of Observations  272  272  272  272  272 
R-Square  0.115  0.117  0.117  0.124  0.259 
Adjusted R-Square  0.088  0.086  0.0836  0.087  0.221 
S.E. of Regression  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.025 
Durbin-Wats  1.395  1.407  1.402  1.377  1.531 
           
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses           38 
Data Source: See Data Appendix           39 
 
Table 13: Effect of Intersectoral and Intergovernmental Allocation of Public Expenditure     
           
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Net State Product Growth Rate       
           
Independent Variables       [1]       [2]        [3]          [4]       [5] 
CONSTANT  -0.697  -0.707  -0.654  -0.658  -1.19 
         [-3.581]       [-3.617]        [-
3.323] 
     [-3.352]       [-
5.876] 
FDCTAXPC  0.01  0.011  0.026  0.026  0.021 
          [2.139]        [2.241]         
[2.708] 
      [2.683]        
[1.315] 
CDEV  1.11  1.126  1.044  1.033  2.225 
          [2.974]        [3.005]         
[2.778] 
      [2.757]        
[5.591] 
CNONDEV  0.453  0.457  0.428  0.408  0.821 
          [2.912]        [2.929]         
[2.741] 
       
2.619] 
      
[5.098] 
CSOCCOM  2.622  2.612  2.675  2.693  9.414 
          [3.604]        [3.585]         
[3.683] 
      [3.719]        
[7.484] 
SADM  0.066  0.07  0.136  0.111  0.022 
         [0.575]        [0.614]         
[1.135] 
     [0.919]         
0.148] 
SEDU  -0.083  -0.073  -0.11  -0.103  -0.098 
         [-1.684]       [-1.429]          [-
2.01] 
     [-1.866]       [-
1.877] 
SHLTH  0.041  0.045  0.066  0.033  -0.047 
           [0.614]        [0.674]         
[0.975] 
        
[0.47] 
     [-
0.701] 
SECON  -0.02  -0.024  -0.032  -0.035  -0.012 
         [-0.795]       [-0.911]        [-
1.226] 
     [-1.318]       [-
0.483] 
AREA    0  0  0  0 
          [0.674]         
[0.109] 
      [0.355]       [-
0.106] 
GDP70      0  0  0 
            [-
1.812] 
       [-
1.82] 
     [-
1.407] 
SCHOOLING        0.104  0.132 
              [1.617]        
[2.192] 
CTAX          -6.079 
               [-
6.186] 
SOTAX          0.07 
                 
[0.44] 
Number of Observations  272  272  272  272  272 
R-Square  0.127  0.128  0.139  0.147  0.263 
Adjusted R-Square  0.1  0.098  0.106  0.111  0.226 
S.E. of Regression  0.027  0.027  0.027  0.026  0.025 
Durbin-Wats  1.395  1.404  1.437  1.397  1.553 
             40 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses         
Data Source: See Data Appendix           41 
Data Appendix 
  Our empirical analysis is based on the aggregate data from Government Finance 
Statistics, International Monetary Fund, and on the annual data for 16 states during the 
period of 1972/73 -1992/93.    Major data sources include “Public Finance: India’s Central 
and State Government” (1996) and “Profiles of States” (1997)    by Economic Intelligence 
Service, India and various publications by Ministry of Finance of the Government of India. 
Variables used for estimations are listed below with their data sources. Names of states 
included in our estimations are also listed. 
 
1.  Data for the following variables for all the 16 states, except for Andhra Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa, are taken from various publications by Ministry of Finance of 
the Government of India: 
 
Y          Real per capita NSP (net state product) growth rate, 5-year moving forward average. 
CDEV    Spending share on development at the central level 
CNONDEV  Spending share on non-development at the central level 
CSOCCOM  Spending share on social and community services at the central level 
SADM    Spending share on administration at state level   
SECON   Spending share on administration at state level 
SEDU    Spending share on administration at state level 
SHLTH    Spending share on administration at state level 
FDCEXP  Fiscal decentralization in expenditure: state vs center 
FDCEXPPC  Fiscal decentralization in expenditure: state vs center, adjusted by population 
FDCTAX  Fiscal decentralization in tax revenue collection: state vs center 
FDCTAXPC  Fiscal decentralization in tax revenue collection: state vs center, adjusted by population 
CTAX    Central tax rate 
SOTAX   State tax rate   
SCHOOLING  School enrollment rate for primary and middle school 
 
2.    Data for the variables mentioned above for Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Orissa are taken from “Public Finance: India’s Central and State Government” (1996)    by 
Economic Intelligence Service, India. 
 
3.  Data for the following two variables are taken from “Profiles of States” (1997 issue)   
by Economic Intelligence Service, India. 
 
GPD70    Initial NSP (as in 1970/71) 
AREA    Area of each state 
 
List of states included in the estimations:   
 
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and 
West Bengal. 